17. .. The Court will begin by asserting whether there is here a “fact” which, although in existence at the date of its Judgment of 11 July 1996, was at that time unknown both to the FRY and to the Court.
18. FRY contended…. “The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new Member on 1 November 2000 is certainly a new fact…. this new fact is such a nature as to be a decisive factor regarding the question of jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY… After the FRY was admitted as a new Member on 1 November 2000… it has became an unequivocal fact that the FRY did not continue the personality of the SFRY, was not a Member of the United Nations before 1 November 2000, was not a Sate party to the Statute, and was not a State party to the Genocide Convention
33. The Court recalls that between the adoption of GA Res 47/1 of 22 September 1992 and the admission of the FRY to the UN on 1 November 2000, the legal position of the FRY remained complex
67. The Court would begin by observing that, under the terms of Article 61, paragraph 1, of the Statute, an application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is “based upon the discovery” of some fact which, “when the judgment was given”, was unknown. These are the characteristics which the “new” fact referred to in paragraph 2 of the Article must possess…. A fact which occurs several years after a judgment has been given is not a “new” fact within the meaning of Article 61.
68. In the present case, the admission of the FRY to the UN occurred on 1 November 2000, well after the 1996 Judgment. The Court concludes accordingly, that that admission cannot be regarded as a new fact within the meaning of Article 61 capable of founding a request for revision of that Judgment.
In the final version of its argument, the FRY claims that its admission to the UN … simply “revealed” two facts which had existed in 1996 but had been unknown at the time: that it was not then a party to the Statute of the Court and that it was not bound by the Genocide Convention
In advancing this argument, the FRY does not rely on facts that existed in 1996. In reality, it bases its Application for revision on the legal consequences which it seeks to draw from the facts subsequent to the Judgment which it is asking to have revised
70 Resolution 47/1 did not inter alia affect the FRY’s right to appear before the Court or to be a party to a dispute before the Court under the conditions laid down by the Statute…. To “terminate the situation created by resolution 47/1”, the FRY had to submit a request for admission to the UN as had been done by the other Republics composing the SFRY. All these elements were known to the Court and to the FRY at the time when the Judgment was given. Nevertheless, what remained unknown in July 1996 was if and when the FRY would apply for membership in the UN and if and when that application would be accepted, thus terminating the situation created by GA Res 47/1