The mandate was established ‘on behalf of the League’ (22.2), ‘securities for the performance’ (22.1) were an annual report to the council (22.7) revised by a commission (22.8)
Individual states of the LN could take part in the administrative process through their participation in the activities of the organs by means of which the LN was entitled to function. They had no direct intervention relative to the mandatory, this was a prerogative of LN organs
While the 1962 judgment decided that the applicants were entitled to invoke the jurisdictional clause of the mandate, it remained for them, on the merits, to establish that they had such a right or interest Any question on admissibility has to be decided on merits (Nottebohm case)
There is no contradiction between a decision that the applicants had the capacity to invoke the jurisdictional clause and a decision that the applicants had not established the legal basis of their claim on the merits
A distinction must be make between the right to activate the court and the plaintiff’s legal right in respect of the subject matter of its claim.
Jurisdictional clauses were adjectival not substantive in their nature and effect, they did not determine whether the parties had substantive rights, but only whether, if they had them, they could vindicate them by recourse to a tribunal.
The ‘necessity’ argument amounted to a plea that the court should allow the equivalent of an action popularis, or right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a public interest. But IL does not know such a right as it stood at present.
The duty of the court was to apply the law as it found it, not to make it.